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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
a third person by securing a promise from the promisor to pay the
promisee's creditor, does not come within the meaning of "sole"
in the statute7 and that such contract must be enforced in a suit
in equity.8 Some of the cases permit recovery under the doctrine
of subrogationY Since in the principal case the distinction be-
tween the two types of beneficiary contracts was not called directly
to the attention of the court, no attempt being made to distinguish
between them, it is doubtful whether the court would follow the
principal case where such distinction would be called directly to
their attention.10 But the principal case may be said to stand,
on its facts, for the proposition that the creditor-beneficiary type
of contract may now be enforced in an action at law in West
Virginia.
EASEMENTS - WAY OF NECESSITY WHERE OTHER MODE OF
ACCESS - CREATION OF EASEMENT BY IMPLIED GRANT. - The
plaintiff, owner of part of the dominant estate and an appurtenant
easement in a private alley separated therefrom by the servient
estate, seeks to enjoin the defendant from obstructing its alleged
way of necessity over the servient estate. Held, that no way of
necessity existed since another mode of ingress and egress was
available to the plaintiff. Decree denying injunction affirmed.
Beckley National Exchange Bank v. Lifly.'
The right to a way of necessity over the servient estate has
been generally denied where there are other modes of ingress and
egress.2 This rule is consistently followed in some jurisdictions
7 Nutter v. Sydenstricker, 11 W. Va. 535 (1877); King v. Scott, 76 W. Va.
59, 84 S. E. 454 (1915); Hamilton v. Wheeling Public Service Co., 88 W. Va.
573, 107 S. B. 401 (1921).
8 Supra n. 5.
S Petty v. Warren, supra n. 5.
10 Judge Hatcher stated the policy of the court: "It is true that the prac-
tice pursued by claimants was followed in the case of .... But no objection
was raised in that case to the manner of bringing the suit, and its violation
of equity procedure was not brought to our attention. Our inadvertence in
that case must not be taken as approval of that practice." State v. Arthur,
106 W. Va. 559, 561, 146 S. E. 619 (1928).
1 182 S. E. 767 (1935).
2 Dorsey v. Dorsey, 109 W. Va. 111, 153 S. E. 146 (1930); Whitehouse v.
Cummings, 83 Me. 91, 21 Atl. 743 (1890); Wills v. Reid, 86 Miss. 446, 38
So. 793 (1905); Peoffees of Grammar School v. Proprietors of Jeffreys' Neck
Pasture, 174 Mass. 572, 55 N. E. 462 (1899); Vossen v. Dautel, 116 Mo. 379,
22 S. W. 734 (1893); Batchelder v. National State Capital Bank, 66 N. H.
386, 22 At. 592 (1891); Staples v. Cornwall, 190 N. Y. 506, 83 N. E. 1132
(1907).
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WEST VTIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
even though hardship results.' Some courts have given the rule
a more liberal interpretation,4 however, so as to include cases
where other possible modes of access cannot be made available
without labor and expense disproportionate to the value of the
dominant estate.' This interpretation has been extended in some
cases to include a "reasonable necessity" where the party has an-
other way, but such way is so limited as to be inadequate to permit
the full enjoyment of the dominant estate.' Though the dominant
estate in the instant case may be deprived of its full enjoyment by
the decision, still a more liberal interpretation would have been a
marked extension of the rule as it now exists in West Virginia.
7
In the light of the exceptions8 to the strict rule as it exists in our
jurisdiction, our court might have implied a way of necessity
under the reasonable enjoyment theory.
An opposite result could also have been reached had the court
found that there was an implied grant of an easement.9 There is
no question but that at the time the dominant and servient estates
were severed that this way was apparent"0 and reasonably
necessary" to the enjoyment of the estates granted. 2  Our court
3 Meredith v. Frank, 56 Ohio St. 479, 47 N. E. 656 (1897); Lankin v.
Terwilliger, 22 Ore. 97, 29 Pac. 268 (1892).
4 Uhl v. Ohio River R. R. Co., 47" W. Va. 59, 34 S. E. 934 (1899) ; Trump
v. McDonnell, 120 Ala. 200, 24 So. 353 (1897); Graines v. Lunsford, 120
Ga. 370, 47 S. E. 967 (1904); Schmidt v. Quinn, 136 Mass. 575 (1883);
Galloway v. Bonesteel, 65 Wis. 79, 26 N. W. 262 (1886).
5Crotty v. New River & Pocahontas Coal Co., 72 W. Va. 68, 78 S. E. 233
(1913); Smith v. Griffin, 14 Colo. 429, 23 Pac. 905 (1890); Watson v.
French, 112 Me. 371, 92 Atl. 290 (1914).6 Simonton, Ways by Necessity (1927) 33 W. VA. L. Q. 64, 74; Goodall
v. Godfrey, 53 Vt. 219 (1880); Smith v. Griffin, supra n. 5; Schmidt v.
Quinn, supra n. 4; Pettingill v. Porter, 90 Mass. 1 (1864); Crotty v. New
River & Pocahontas Coal Co., supra n. 5.
7 Miller v. Skaggs, 79 W. Va. 645, 91 S. E. 536 (1917) ; Henrie v. Johnson,
28 W. Va. 190 (1886); Uhl v. Ohio River R. R. Co., supra n. 4; Crotty v.
New River & Pocahontas Coal Co., supra n. 5; Hoffman v. Shoemaker, 69
W. Va. 233, 171 S. E. 198 (1911) ; Dorsey v. Dorsey, supra n. 2. Of. Phoenix
Nat'l Bank v. United States Security Trust Co., 100 Conn. 622, 124 Atl.
540, 34 A. L. R. 963 (1924).
8 Uhl v. Ohio River R. R. Co., supra n. 4; Crotty v. New River & Pocahontas
Coal Co., supra n. 5.
9 Smyth v. Brick Row Realty Co., 97 W. Va. 40, 124 S. E. 499 (1924);
East Atlanta Land Co. v. Mower, 138 Ga. 380, 75 S. E. 418 (1912); Waters
v. Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Co., 115 N. C. 648, 20 S. E. 718 (1894); Miller
v. Skaggs, supra n. 7.
10 Miller v. Skaggs, supra n. 7.
11 In construing the right to a way by necessity, our court has once held
that it must be an "absolute necessity", while only a "reasonable necessify"
is necessary to imply the grant of an easement. Dorsey v. Dorsey, supra n.
2; Miller v. Skaggs, supra n. 7.
12 It should be kept in mind that two separate estates were granted in the
2
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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
has found that such an easement does not have to be continuous in
nature.1 3 Since this would be an implication of a grant, it would
of course be subject to a liberal construction in favor of the
grantee.
14
INSURANCE - FALSE STATEMENTS IN APPLICATION FOR LrE
POLICY AS DEFENSE TO IABILITY - DUTY OF o PANY's AGENT TO
TEcoRD CORRECTLY APPLICANT'S ANSWERS. - Action was brought
to recover compensation under the disability clause of an insurance
policy. The defense was that a prior injury had been falsely
denied in the application. Although the insured had truthfully
admitted this previous injury, incorrect answers were recorded
by the company's medical examiner. Held, that the false state-
ments in the application constituted no defense, since the insur-
ance company was bound by the act of its agent. Kincaid v.
Equitable Life Assurance Society."
The rule adopted by the majority of the courts is that if the
agent falsely inserts answers in the application without the knowl-
edge of the person seeking insurance, the company will then be
estopped to urge the defense of misrepresentation.2 This doctrine
prevails apparently without regard to whether such acts of the
agent were done fraudulently' or by mistake.4 A few jurisdictions,
however, have mistakenly invoked the parol evidence rule in re-
fusing to admit evidence of the oral transaction., In the federal
courts, answers falsely inserted by the agent may be used as a
principal case; (1) the dominant estate, and (2) the easement in the private
alley.
3 C"The legal principle requiring an easement to be 'continuous' as a
requisite to a grant or reservation thereof by implication, is not applicable
to a way."2 Hoffman v. Shoemaker, supra n. 7.
"fDeer Creek Lumber Co. v. Sheets, 75 W. Va. 21, 83 S. E. 81 (1914).
1183 S. E. 40 (W. Va. 1935).
2 Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Chamberlain, 132 U. S. 304, 10 S. Ct. 87
(1889); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Warttenburg, 79 Fed. 245 (C. C. A. 9th, 1897);
McCall v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 9 W. Va. 237 (1876); Medley v.
German Alliance Ins. Co., 55 W. Va. 342, 47 S. E. 101 (1904); Insurance Co.
v. Williams, 39 Ohio St. 584 (1883); Mink v. Ins. Co., 76 Cal. 50, 14 Pac.
837 (1888).
a Creed v. Sun Fire Office, 101 Ala. 522, 14 So. 323 (1893) ; Germania Fire
Ins. Co. v. McKee, 94 ]11. 494 (1880).
'Bennett v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 106 N. Y. 243, 12 N. E. 609 (1887).
5 McCoy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 135 Mass. 82 (1882); Thomas v.
Commercial Union Assur. Co., 162 Mass. 29, 37 N. E. 672 (1894); Franklin
Fire Ins. Co. v. Martin, 40 N. J. Law 568 (1878) ; Martin v. Ins. Co. of North
America, 57 N. 3. Law 623, 31 Atl. 213 (1895).
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